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THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS: CORPORATE
VICARIOUS CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE
NEGLIGENT DISCHARGE OF OIL UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT
Katherine A. Swanson
Abstract: In response to massive oil spills that damaged America’s waters, devastated
local economies, killed wildlife, and cost taxpayers millions in clean-up costs, Congress
passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The Act amended the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act to allow for criminal prosecution of negligent oil discharges. This Comment argues that
although the plain language of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act’s negligent discharge
provision is silent regarding corporate vicarious criminal liability, courts should give full
effect to Congress’s intent—to protect the health and safety of the public and the
environment and to stop corporations from accepting oils spills as just another cost of doing
business—and construe the negligent discharge provision to allow for vicarious liability.
Doing so will not violate the due process rights of corporations because they are on notice of
the stringent regulations surrounding oil pollution. Moreover, corporations are in the best
position to prevent and deter negligent employee behavior that leads to oils spills in the first
place.

INTRODUCTION
A thick layer of fog covered the San Francisco Bay area1 on
November 7, 20072 when a bay pilot, Captain John Cota, boarded the
Cosco Busan, a container ship operated by Fleet Management, Limited
(Fleet).3 Cota and Fleet allegedly failed to prepare and review a passage
plan prior to departure4 and guided the vessel out of the bay in visibility
of less than a quarter mile.5 According to the third superseding
indictment, the ship proceeded too quickly, and Cota and Fleet, in
addition to making other navigational errors, failed to use the vessel’s

1. Kirsten B. Mitchell, Fog Seemingly Baffled Pilot in Bay Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at
A16.
2. Carolyn Marshall, Head of Oil Spill Cleanup is Retiring, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2007, at A12.
3. Mitchell, supra note 1, at A16.
4. Third Superseding Indictment at 5, United States v. Cota, No. 08-00160 (N.D. Cal. filed May
26, 2009); see Information at 4, Cota, No. 08-00160 (filed Mar. 17, 2008); Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Company that Managed Cosco Busan Indicted on New Charges (July 23, 2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-enrd-642.html [hereinafter Indictment Press Release].
5. Mitchell, supra note 1, at A16.
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radar and electronic chart system properly.6 As a result, they “failed to
navigate an allision free course,”7 and the vessel allided with a tower of
the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge,8 splitting open fuel tanks and
spilling more than 50,000 gallons of diesel fuel and oil into the bay.9 The
spill killed thousands of birds10 and left forty miles of beaches and shore
contaminated.11 The National Transportation Safety Board estimated the
cost of clean up at $70 million, ship repairs at $2.1 million and bridge
repairs at $1.5 million.12
As a result of the spill, both Cota and Fleet were charged with
negligent discharge of oil into navigable waters of the United States
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the
Clean Water Act (CWA).13 In prosecuting Fleet, the U.S. Government
has relied on the civil negligence standard—failure to take due care—
applicable under the CWA negligent discharge provision in order to
incorporate the agency principle of negligent supervision.14 Trial is

6. Third Superseding Indictment, supra note 4, at 5; Information, supra note 4, at 4.
7. Third Superseding Indictment, supra note 4, at 5.
8. Mitchell, supra note 1, at A16.
9. Felicity Barringer, Oil Spill Fouls Shores in San Francisco Area, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at
A18.
10. San Francisco to Receive Spill Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at A15.
11. Marshall, supra note 2, at A12.
12. NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/MAR-09/01, MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT: ALLISION OF
HONG KONG-REGISTERED CONTAINERSHIP M/V COSCO BUSAN WITH THE DELTA TOWER OF THE
SAN FRANCISCO–OAKLAND BAY BRIDGE, at XI (2009), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/
2009/MAR0901.pdf.
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)(A), 1321(b)(3) (2006); Third
Superseding Indictment, supra note 4, at 5–6. Captain Cota pleaded guilty to negligent discharge of
oil and to a violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Guilty Plea
in Case of Cosco Busan Ship Pilot (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09enrd-201.html [hereinafter Guilty Plea Press Release]. The plea agreement proposed a sentence
between two and ten months’ incarceration, a fine between $3,000 and $30,000, and government
agreement to dismiss false statement charges. Id. Cota was sentenced on July 17, 2009 to ten
months in federal prison. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Prison Sentence for Cosco Busan Pilot
(July 17, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-enrd-698.html.
14. See Government’s Opposition to Defendant Fleet’s Motion to Plead Nolo Contendere at 3,
Cota, No. 08-00160 (filed Sept. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Government’s Opposition Brief] (“It was a
corporate decision to forgo adequate training and supervision.”); see also United States v.
Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the plain language of the Clean
Water Act (CWA) negligent discharge provision requires only ordinary negligence); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.03, 7.05 (2006) (asserting that principals are liable for negligently
selecting and supervising agents).
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scheduled for September 2009.15 Fleet originally faced a maximum
$200,000 fine for its CWA violations or twice the gross gain or loss
caused by the violations under the Alternative Fines Act.16 Now, after a
third superseding indictment alleging “approximately $20 million in
pecuniary losses,” Fleet faces a $40 million fine.17
Although the Government proceeded under a direct liability theory
against Fleet, courts should also recognize a respondeat superior theory,
which would hold corporations vicariously criminally liable for
negligent oil discharges by their employees. The negligent discharge
provision does not explicitly call for vicarious liability. However, the
legislative intent behind the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90),18
which amended the CWA, and the public welfare nature of the
legislation support such an interpretation.19 Allowing prosecution under
vicarious criminal liability would mean that when employees, such as
crew members, are found guilty of negligent discharge of oil under the
CWA, corporations, such as ship management corporations, vessel
owners, and demise charterers, could also be subject to liability.20
Part I of this Comment briefly describes the CWA negligent discharge
provision and examines the legislative history of the provision, as
amended by OPA 90, including its public welfare nature and Congress’s
interest in holding corporations liable for oil spills. Part II further
15. Guilty Plea Press Release, supra note 13.
16. Indictment Press Release, supra note 4; see 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006) (alternative fine
based on twice pecuniary gain or loss).
17. Cota, No. 08-00160, slip op. at 2–3, 2009 WL 1765647, at *1 (June 22, 2009) (denying
Fleet’s motion to plead guilty to negligent discharge violations under the second superseding
indictment); Third Superseding Indictment, supra note 4, at 6 (alleging negligent discharge of oil
“resulted in at least approximately $20 million in pecuniary losses to persons”).
18. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
19. See discussion infra Parts II and IV.A.
20. Although vessel owners and operators, which are typically corporate entities, are strictly
liable for civil damages and clean-up costs under the CWA and OPA 90, such corporations are
generally in the best position to limit negligent employee conduct that injures third parties. See 33
U.S.C. § 2702 (2006). Corporations involved in the shipping industry and oil-related industries are
heavily insured, and protection and indemnity agreements frequently allow corporations to escape
large portions of civil liability for oil spills. See Cota, No. 08-00160, slip op. at 4, 2008 WL
4531804, at *2 (Oct. 7, 2008) (denying Fleet’s motion to enter a plea of nolo contendere) (“The
possibility that Fleet’s civil penalties will be covered by its insurers suggests that civil sanctions
alone are an insufficient deterrent.”); Government’s Opposition Brief, supra note 14, at 4 n.2. See
generally THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 17.2 (4th ed. 2001)
(discussing marine insurance).
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explores the public welfare status of the CWA and how it affects
statutory interpretation. Part III explains how the civil justifications for
vicarious liability also apply in the criminal context and discusses how
courts apply such principles, specifically when environmental statutes
are at issue. Part IV argues that although the plain language of the CWA
negligent discharge provision is silent regarding corporate vicarious
liability, Congress’s intent and the public welfare nature of the CWA
should guide courts in interpreting the statute to permit the prosecution
of corporations under such a theory.
I.

CONGRESS PASSED OPA 90 TO HOLD CORPORATIONS
CRIMINALLY LIABLE AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC AND
ENVIRONMENT FROM MASSIVE OIL SPILLS

Congress adopted the CWA and its amendments to “restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters” by eliminating discharges of pollutants.21 Congress included
different administrative, civil, and criminal penalties to encourage and
enforce compliance.22
When Congress passed OPA 90, it amended the CWA’s list of
substantive criminal violations to include negligent discharge of oil.23 As
a result, section 1321(b)(3)(i) of the CWA, which prohibits unauthorized
discharge of oil into the navigable waters of the United States,24 works
with the enforcement provision of section 1319(c)(1)(A)25 to prohibit the

21. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat.
816 (1972) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2006)).
22. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006).
23. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4301(c), 104 Stat. 534 (1990) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(1)(A), 1321(b)(3) (2006)).
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)(i) (“[Oil discharge] into or upon the navigable waters of the United
States, adjoining shorelines, [unless authorized by permit] . . . in such quantities as may be
harmful . . . is prohibited.”). Congress defined “oil” as “oil of any kind or in any form, including,
but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil, sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than
dredged spoil.” Id. § 1321(a)(1). “‘[D]ischarge’ includes, but is not limited to, any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping . . . [unless otherwise permitted by law].” Id.
§ 1321(a)(2). The Environmental Protection Agency determined that a quantity that may be harmful
includes “a film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of the water or adjoining shorelines.”
40 C.F.R. § 110.3(b) (2008); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 27, 29–30
(5th Cir. 1990) (discussing “sheen test”).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (providing that “[a]ny person who . . . negligently violates” title 33,
section 1321(b)(3) “shall be punished”).
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negligent discharge of oil by any “person.” “Person” includes
individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations,26 and responsible
corporate officers.27 Corporations found guilty of negligent discharge
face fines between $2,500 and $25,000 for each day of violation,28 and
those fines may increase under the Alternative Fines Act.29 Courts can
also place corporations on probation and mandate restitution to victims
or substitute restitution in lieu of criminal sanctions.30
Although Congress did not address the issue of vicarious liability in
relation to the negligent discharge provision in the text of the statute, the
legislative history of OPA 90 provides some guidance. First, Congress
passed OPA 90 and amended the CWA in response to massive oil spills,
such as the Exxon Valdez spill, because such spills threaten the health
and safety of the public as well as the environment.31 Second, Congress
expressed particular concern that corporations were failing to take
sufficient measures to prevent oil spills in the first place, and when spills
did occur, corporations failed to adequately clean up and to compensate

26. Id. § 1362(5).
27. Id. § 1319(c)(6) (“For the purpose of this subsection, the term ‘person’ means, in addition to
the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title, any responsible corporate officer.”).
28. Id. § 1319(c)(1) (“[Persons found guilty] shall be punished by a fine of not less than $2,500
nor more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or by
both. If a conviction of a person is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person
under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of not more than $50,000 per day of violation,
or by imprisonment of not more than 2 years, or by both.”).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)–(d) (2006); United States v. Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 529, 533 (4th Cir.
2001) (holding Alternative Fines Act applies to CWA violation). Under the Alternative Fines Act,
class A misdemeanors for negligent discharge violations committed by corporations allow for a
$200,000 fine when the offense “does not result in death,” a $500,000 fine when the offense does
result in death, or a fine of “not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross
loss.” 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)–(d).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3556 (“The court, in imposing a sentence on a defendant who has been found
guilty of an offense shall order restitution in accordance with section 3663A, and may order
restitution in accordance with section 3663. The procedures under section 3664 shall apply to all
orders or restitution under this section.”). In addition, convicted corporations may lose government
contracts until the Environmental Protection Agency determines the conditions that caused the spill
are corrected. 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (“No Federal agency may enter into any contract with any person,
who has been convicted of any offense under section 1319(c) of this title, for the procurement of
goods, materials, and services if such contract is to be performed at any facility at which the
violation which gave rise to such conviction occurred, and if such facility is owned, leased, or
supervised by such person. The prohibition in the preceding sentence shall continue until the
Administrator certifies that the condition giving rise to such conviction has been corrected.”).
31. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2–3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24.
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victims, including the government.32
A.

Congress Expressed Deep Concern that Oil Spills Posed a
Significant Danger to the Public and Environment

On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground and spilled over
11 million gallons of oil into Prince William Sound, Alaska.33 It was the
largest oil spill in the history of the United States.34 Crude oil covered
hundreds of miles of coastline, killed over 26,000 birds, and harmed
other sea life.35 The company’s and the government’s slow and
inadequate response to the spill only worsened the problem.36 Later that
year, three more oil spills occurred: one off the coast of Rhode Island,
one in the Delaware River, and one in the Houston Ship Channel in
Texas.37 While the response to these spills proved better than the
response to the Exxon Valdez, Congress did not find them “unqualified
success[es].”38
To protect the public from the consequences of such spills, Congress
passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.39 The Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works (Public Works Committee) found that
“oil pollution from accidental tanker spills [was] a real and continuing
threat to the public health and welfare and the environment.”40 Congress
adopted the legislation to prevent oil spills, improve clean-up responses,
and increase liability for those causing spills.41 Congress explicitly stated
its policy to allow “no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or
upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or
into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone.”42

32. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24.
33. S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 1 (1989) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 750, 750.
34. Id.; S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24.
35. S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 1–2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 750, 750.
36. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
37. Id.; S. REP. NO. 101-99, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 750, 750.
38. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724.
39. See id. at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2–5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–27.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (2006).
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B.

Congress Expressed Particular Concern that Corporations
Involved in Oil Spills Evaded Their Responsibilities to Prevent
Them and to Participate in Clean-Up Efforts

Congressional reports and debate surrounding the passage of OPA 90
focused heavily on corporations’ failure to pay for oil spills, both in
terms of prevention and clean up. The Public Works Committee stated in
a report,43 and Senator Baucus said in a statement from the floor, that
companies accepted oil spills as part of the normal course of business.44
The report noted:
[S]pills are still too much of an accepted cost of doing business
for the oil shipping industry. At the present time, the costs of
spilling and paying for its clean-up and damage is not high
enough to encourage greater industry efforts to prevent spills
and develop effective techniques to contain them. Sound public
policy requires reversal of these relative costs.45
The Public Works Committee also found the regulatory system
governed by federal and state law inadequate to cover clean-up costs and
damages because owners and operators of vessels faced low liability
limits.46 In addition, many parties, including the government, found it
impossible to receive full compensation for damages because courts
interpreted the CWA to preempt common law maritime tort and
nuisance claims.47 Representative Lipinski noted that the Exxon
Corporation wrote off clean-up expenses on its taxes as “ordinary and
necessary business expenses.”48 Similarly, the Public Works Committee
report noted that taxpayers regularly subsidize clean-up efforts.49 The
United States General Accounting Office reported to Congress that
43. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724.
44. 136 CONG. REC. 21,716 (1990) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (“[Oil] spills are too much an
accepted cost of doing business for the oil shipping industry. Many in the industry seem to have
decided that it is cheaper to spill and pay for its cleanup than it is to prevent spils [sic] and develop
effective techniques to contain them.”).
45. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724; see also S. REP. NO. 10199, at 33–34 (1989) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 750, 776–77 (statement of Sen.
Gorton) (noting that Exxon representatives were arrogant in committee hearings, stressing the need
for a stricter liability regime, and emphasizing the need to penalize negligent corporations).
46. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2–3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24.
47. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 725.
48. 135 CONG. REC. 5793 (1989) (extension of remarks by Rep. William O. Lipinski).
49. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
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between 1971 and 1982, under the pre-OPA 90 statutory provisions, the
United States Government paid out $124 million for oil-spill clean up
but recovered only $49 million.50 As a result, taxpayers subsidized over
$75 million to clean up oil spills.51
In other words, Congress needed to find new ways to deter
corporations from engaging in behavior that would lead to oil spills. One
method of deterrence Congress employed was to increase criminal
penalties by amending the CWA to establish criminal sanctions for
negligent and knowing discharges of oil.52
In a statement on the Senate floor in support of OPA 90, Senator
Lieberman indicated it was his “intent in writing the penalty
provisions . . . [that] the Government apply the penalty provisions in a
manner which will punish the violator and deter and prevent future
violations.”53 He also said that:
The strong civil and criminal penalty provisions of this bill are
designed to ensure that companies will act in a manner which
protects our fragile environment . . . . [and] the most effective
way to ensure that companies act in a manner which will prevent
the spill in the first place is to spell out the consequences of their
failure to do so.54
The Public Works Committee also identified other barriers to an
effective oil spill regulation regime including “the corporate form, and
the burdens of proof that favor those responsible for the spill.”55 In other
words, it is difficult to detect, investigate, and prosecute corporate
crimes. Thus, OPA 90 allows prosecutors to seek a wide variety of
criminal penalties because Congress provided that the legislation should
not be construed to affect the government’s ability to “impose additional
liability or additional requirements, or to impose, or to determine the
amount of, any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for
any violation of law, relating to the discharge . . . of oil.”56 Therefore,
50. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724.
51. Id.
52. Oil Pollution Control Act 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4301(c), 104 Stat. 484 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1321(b)(3) (2006)); H.R. REP. NO. 101-653, at 154 (1990) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 833.
53. 136 CONG. REC. 21,724 (1990).
54. Id.
55. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
56. Id. at 17–18, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 739; H.R. REP. NO. 101-653, at 122,
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prosecutors can use other laws to attach additional liability to violators
and often do so. For example, in the case of Fleet, a grand jury indicted
the company for making false statements and violating the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act in addition to negligent discharge.57
In sum, the Exxon Valdez oil spill motivated Congress to strengthen
the CWA and other statutes through OPA 90. Congress’s concern was
for the health and safety of the public as well as the failure of
corporations to prevent and adequately pay for oil-spill clean up. As a
result, Congress adopted provisions to strengthen corporate civil and
criminal liability.
II.

THE CLEAN WATER ACT CONSTITUTES PUBLIC
WELFARE LEGISLATION SO COURTS CAN CONSTRUE
IT BROADLY

Public welfare legislation is designed to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the public.58 Under such legislation, Congress imposes a
heavier responsibility on individuals and corporations because they
“stand[] in responsible relation to a public danger” and are in the best
position to protect the public at large.59 In essence, public welfare
legislation helps “ease the prosecution’s path to conviction.”60 For
example, in United States v. Dotterweich,61 the Supreme Court
determined that, in order to regulate behavior, Congress has authority to
criminalize conduct and eliminate the common law mens rea
requirement that defendants know they are violating the law.62 In such
cases, the lowering of mens rea does not violate due process because “a
reasonable person should know [one] is subject to stringent public
regulation and may seriously threaten the community’s health or
safety.”63
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 800.
57. Third Superseding Indictment, supra note 4, at 7–10.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278, 280–81, 284 (1943) (holding
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act permitted vicarious criminal liability for shipments of
misbranded pharmaceuticals because Congress intended to protect the health and welfare of the
public).
59. Id. at 281 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
60. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
61. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
62. Id. at 280–81.
63. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 432–33 (1985).
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Typically, public welfare legislation regulates hazardous or “injurious
items”64 and only imposes “light penalties,” such as fines or short terms
of incarceration.65 Although the government need not prove a defendant
knew or had actual knowledge that he or she violated a particular
regulation, the government must still prove the defendant actually
handled the regulated substance.66 When substances are “dangerous or
deleterious,” courts can presume a corporation is aware of the regulation
because the probability that the substances are regulated is so high.67
Determining whether a statute is public welfare legislation is an issue
of statutory construction that turns on legislative intent.68 First, courts
look to the plain meaning of the statute.69 If the meaning is unclear,
criminal statutes are traditionally construed in light of the common law,
which requires mens rea,70 and in the light most favorable to the
defendant under the rule of lenity.71 The policy behind the rule of lenity
is that it is unfair and a violation of procedural due process to convict a
defendant of a crime without providing fair warning.72 However, a court
need only apply the rule of lenity if, after reviewing congressional intent,
the statute is still ambiguous.73 As a result, most courts never reach the
rule of lenity in the public welfare context because they find Congress’s
intent unambiguously established a public welfare statute.74 Moreover,
many courts apply the remedial purpose doctrine to environmental
statutes, which requires courts to avoid construing environmental
criminal statutes narrowly because they are intended to protect the

64. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994).
65. Id. at 616.
66. See id. at 607 n.3 (citing United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558
(1971)).
67. Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 565.
68. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 604–05.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 605–06.
71. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); see generally NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D.
SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 65A:11–12 (7th ed.
2008) (arguing for and against applying the rule of lenity in the environmental context).
72. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 71, § 59:4, at 187–88.
73. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (reasoning that if the intent of Congress
is clear and does not create a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty,” then the rule of lenity does not
apply (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974))); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427;
see SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 71, § 59:4, at 191–95.
74. E.g., United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999).
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environment and, in turn, human health.75
The Supreme Court has yet to determine explicitly whether the CWA
is public welfare legislation and, thus, whether due process demands the
remedial purpose doctrine or the rule of lenity to apply to ambiguous
CWA criminal provisions. However, when the Supreme Court declined
to grant a writ of certiorari in United States v. Hanousek,76 a case
challenging the ordinary negligence standard used under the negligent
discharge provision,77 Justice Thomas dissented.78 He found it
“erroneous to rely, even in small part, on the notion that the CWA is a
public welfare statute” in addressing Hanousek’s due process claim, as
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had done.79 Thus, he called into
question what law Congress actually passed and whether the CWA
would meet constitutional due process standards if it were in fact public
welfare legislation.80 Justice Thomas pointed out that while “dangerous
and deleterious devices” that actually alert individuals to a public danger
fall into the category of public welfare legislation, the CWA can also
impose criminal liability in cases where ordinary equipment is used for
ordinary purposes.81 He also indicated that crimes committed under
public welfare legislation are “relatively small, and conviction does no
grave damage to an offender’s reputation,” while the fines and
imprisonment under the CWA are much more serious.82
75. E.g., United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1091 (10th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that courts should
not construe the Resource Conservation Recovery Act narrowly because it is a public welfare
statute designed to protect the public); SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 71, § 65A:11, at 761.
76. 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1102 (2000). Hanousek contested the
negligent discharge jury instruction because it set the culpability standard at ordinary negligence, or
failure to use reasonable care, instead of a criminal negligence standard, or gross deviation from due
care, used under the common law and Model Penal Code. Brief of Appellant at *20–24, Hanousek,
176 F.3d 1116 (No. 97-30185). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (1962) (“A person
acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The
risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature
and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”).
77. Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1120–22.
78. Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1102 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 1103. Contra Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121–22 (relying on United States v. Weitzenhoff,
35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993), which determined that the CWA constituted public welfare
legislation).
80. Hanousek, 528 U.S. at 1102–03.
81. Id. at 1103 (quoting Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 613 n.6 (1994)).
82. Id. at 1104 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952)).
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Nevertheless, the majority of federal circuit courts of appeals that
have addressed the issue still hold that the CWA is public welfare
legislation.83 The courts look to the purpose of the CWA—to protect the
nation’s water from hazardous pollution—and Congress’s legislative
intent.84 In United States v. Weitzenhoff,85 the Ninth Circuit summarized
the public welfare nature of the CWA:
[T]he dumping of sewage and other pollutants into our nation’s
waters is precisely the type of activity that puts the discharger on
notice that his acts may pose a public danger. Like other public
welfare offenses that regulate the discharge of pollutants into the
air, the disposal of hazardous wastes, the undocumented
shipping of acids, and the use of pesticides on our food, the
improper and excessive discharge of sewage causes cholera,
hepatitis, and other serious illnesses, and can have serious
repercussions for public health and welfare.
The criminal provisions of the CWA are clearly designed to
protect the public at large from the potentially dire consequences of
water pollution.86

83. Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121 n.3; United States v. Sinksky, 119 F.3d 712, 715–16 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding the “knowingly discharge” provision did not require proof the defendant knew he
violated the CWA and knew the CWA regulated hazardous waste and relying, in part, on the nature
of “the CWA, which regulates discharge into the public’s water”); United States v. Hopkins, 53
F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, and determining that the legislative
history and public welfare purpose of the CWA knowing discharge provision did not require
knowledge of a CWA violation); Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1286; see also United States v. Ortiz, 427
F.3d 1278, 1280, 1283 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Hanousek and holding no heightened level of mens
rea for negligent discharge of propylene glycol). But see United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386,
388, 391 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding the CWA did not constitute public welfare legislation, requiring
knowledge for knowing discharge conviction because the gas at issue was sufficiently
commonplace, and finding that the criminal penalties imposed were too high).
84. E.g., Sinksky, 119 F.3d at 716.
85. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993).
86. Id. at 1286 (citations and footnote omitted).
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III.

COURTS RELY ON AGENCY LAW TO HOLD
CORPORATIONS VICARIOUSLY CRIMINALLY LIABLE
FOR THE TORTIOUS ACTS OF THEIR AGENTS

The law of agency applies in the civil as well as the criminal context.
The doctrine of respondeat superior, which provides the basis for
vicarious liability, can be applied to criminal statutes to hold
corporations liable for the acts of their employees.87 When Congress
does not expressly allow for vicarious liability, courts must look to the
intent behind the legislation.88 Often courts will look to statutes with
similar provisions and interpret them in pari materia, or construe similar
statutes consistently, particularly when interpreting environmental
statutes.89 Moreover, courts tend to rely on the public welfare nature of
environmental statutes and construe them to allow for corporate
vicarious criminal liability.90
A.

Agency Principles Behind Respondeat Superior Liability
Support Holding Corporations Vicariously Criminally Liable
for the Acts of Their Agents

The doctrine of respondeat superior provides the basis for holding
principals vicariously liable for the acts of their agents, done within the
scope of their employment, that injure third parties.91 The law developed
87. E.g., N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94 (1909).
88. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (“Where, as here, resolution of a question of
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language
and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.”).
89. E.g., Nat’l Envtl. Found. v. ABC Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1096, 1097 (11th Cir. 1991)
(construing a CWA provision consistent with a similar provision in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) (“And where Congress
borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of
practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed
word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.”).
90. E.g., United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6, 8–10 (E.D. Ark. 1978)
(holding city sewer committee vicariously criminally liable under the CWA for knowingly making
false reports, based on the actions of a sewer plant employee). While this Comment discusses
vicarious liability, one may also proceed under a direct negligence liability theory. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.04 (2006) (principal liable when agent has acted with
authority or principal ratified action); id. § 7.05 (principal liable for negligent hiring and
supervising); id. § 7.06 (principal cannot avoid liability by delegating a duty to protect another).
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.04 cmt. b, 7.07 cmt. b; see also id. § 7.07(2) (“An
employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work assigned by the employer or
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to encourage employers to reduce tortious conduct.92 The law dispenses
with the culpable conduct requirement of liability and imposes vicarious
liability on the employer because of the nature of the corporate form, the
need to deter tortious conduct, and society’s determination that
corporations should bear the cost of such conduct.93
Because organizations can only act through their agents94 and are
often in the best position to protect third parties, the theories of
respondeat superior and vicarious liability allow victims of tortious
conduct to hold corporations liable.95 It is often difficult to identify an
employer’s direct negligence.96 For instance, the corporate form can
prevent an individual from knowing which employees actually
committed the tortious act.97 Frequently it is also unclear which
employees took action or where “[l]ines of authority and responsibility”
lie within the corporation.98 Records and personnel are often located
across the United States or in different countries, making it difficult for

engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer’s control.”). Most courts also require proof
that the agent acted to further the interest of the employer in order to show the agent acted within
the scope of employment. E.g., United States v. Koppers, 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 1981).
However, many courts will still hold an employer vicariously liable even if the employee is only
partially acting to further the employer’s interest and even if the employer expressly forbade the
activity. E.g., United States v. Cincotta, 698 F.2d 238, 241–42 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v.
Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1979); Moecker v. Honeywell, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1312
(M.D. Fla. 2001).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b.
93. See id. §§ 2.04 cmt. b, 7.04 cmt. b. Although corporations are generally not liable for general
contractors, some duties, as a matter of policy, cannot be transferred and are non-delegable. DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 337 (2000). In such cases, courts will assert an employer/agent
relationship for the purposes of vicarious liability because the corporation still benefits from the
work of the contractor and because the corporation has a duty to hire competent contractors. Id.
94. N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. c.
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b.
96. Id.; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §13.4(d), at 700 (4th ed. 2003). See generally DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 9-28.300 (1997) [hereinafter BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS MANUAL], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm (requiring United
States Attorneys to look at additional factors when deciding to charge corporations because the
corporate form creates unique challenges).
97. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1755 (1996) (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 170–75 (1987)).
98. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS MANUAL, supra note 96, § 9-28.700.
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prosecutors to gather evidence and determine what exactly occurred.99
Employers can also structure the work of employees to limit
“discretion and individual action,” thereby minimizing opportunities for
“unreasonable decisions.”100 Because the employer has control over
“how work is done,”101 it can deter tortious and criminal behavior. Even
in cases where control over an employee is attenuated, corporations still
influence the actions of their employees through threats of disciplinary
measures.102 Moreover, the corporate entity traditionally acts “more
rationally and reasonably” than individuals because the corporation
assigns different parties different tasks, which leads to mutual
supervision of other employees’ actions and helps avoid and deter
tortious conduct.103 Although failing to supervise an employee or
negligently hiring an employee is a direct source of liability for
corporations, some courts also find that vicarious liability incentivizes
corporations to hire the right employees and to “structure work within
the organization so as to reduce the incidence of tortious conduct.”104
Vicarious liability is also justified by risk distribution principles.105
Corporations should bear the risk of becoming vicariously liable because
they have control over their business, manage “the work of employees,”
and “stand[] to profit from the employee’s services.”106 Corporations
may gain significantly if things go as planned, so to avoid unjust
enrichment they must bear the risk of harm posed by employees.107 In
addition, individual employees are not frequently in a position to pay the
total cost of real damages.108

99. Id.
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b.
101. Id.
102. See Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1736 (1996).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b.
104. CEH Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming trial court’s
imposition of vicarious liability for punitive damages on shipowner because it “encourages
shipowners to hire qualified and responsible captains and to exercise supervisory power over them”
(quoting CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 880 F. Supp. 940, 956 (D.R.I. 1995))).
105. Tony Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law—Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 73, 85 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. See Schwartz, supra note 97, at 1756.
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Courts Rely on the Public Welfare Nature of Environmental
Legislation to Construe Statutes and Hold Corporations
Vicariously Liable for the Criminal Acts of Their Employees

In order to hold corporations vicariously criminally liable, courts
apply agency principles similar to those used in the civil context.109
Congress frequently fails to specify whether vicarious liability applies,
so courts must engage in statutory construction.110 Courts should not
presume that statutes imposing strict liability, which dispenses with the
mental fault criminal element, also automatically impose vicarious
liability, which dispenses with the guilty act criminal element.111
However, in cases involving Congress’s regulation of dangerous
materials, such an interpretation is usually justified because it is unlikely
Congress would want corporations to escape liability.112 Moreover, if a
statute only imposes a light misdemeanor penalty, such as a fine, courts
are more likely to construe the statute to allow vicarious liability.113
In the environmental context, many courts provide little if any
109. See, e.g., N.Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–94
(expanding the civil vicarious liability principle used in torts to the criminal context “in the interest
of public policy”). To impose vicarious criminal liability courts generally require: 1) the
corporation’s agent or employee committed the offense; 2) in committing the offense the agent
acted, “at least in part, to benefit” the corporation; and 3) the agent acted within his/her authority or
within the scope of employment, which requires that the act “must deal with a matter whose
performance is generally entrusted to the agent or employee.” PATTERN CRIMINAL FED. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 5.03 (1998), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
pjury.pdf. Employers are not relieved of liability by having a policy against tortious conduct in
place, but such policies can be used to determine whether the agent was acting to benefit the
employer or acting within the scope of employment. Id.
110. See LAFAVE, supra note 96, § 13.4(b), at 695–96.
111. See id. § 13.4(b), at 697–98. In cases where Congress requires “knowing” or “willful” intent,
“it will not be presumed that the legislature intended that the fault of the employee should suffice
for conviction of the employer.” Id. § 13.4(b), at 696. However, the Seventh Circuit pattern jury
instruction’s commentary asserts that the majority of courts impose vicarious liability unless
Congress specifically indicates otherwise. PATTERN CRIMINAL FED. JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 5.03 (1998).
112. See LAFAVE, supra note 96, § 13.4(b), at 698 (citing Groff v. State, 85 N.E. 769 (1908)).
113. See id. § 13.4(b), at 696 (citations omitted). It is unclear if courts will consider the
augmentation of fines under the Alternative Fines Act (AFA) when they evaluate the severity of
penalties in order to construe the CWA because the issue has not been argued. In United States v.
Hong, the Fourth Circuit held the AFA applied to the negligent discharge of wastewater under
section 1319(c)(1)(A) of the CWA. 242 F.3d 528, 530, 533 (4th Cir. 2001). As a result, the
magistrate judge imposed fines of $100,000 for each count instead of the $25,000 maximum under
the CWA. Id. at 533. However, Hong did not challenge the fines based on a due process theory;
instead, he argued that the CWA maximum fines provision limited the application of the AFA. Id.
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analysis on the matter of vicarious criminal liability.114 Most likely this
is because many environmental criminal matters are settled prior to
trial115 or defendants do not raise the issue.116 For example, in United
States v. Hayes International Corp.,117 an employee gave drainage from
fuel tanks along with mixtures of paints and solvents to a third party,
knowing the wastes were not being recycled.118 Although the company
had an express policy against such activities, the Eleventh Circuit
reinstated a conviction for unlawful transportation of hazardous waste
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, stating simply that
“Hayes’ liability is based on the actions of [the employee].”119
In United States v. Ionia Management, S.A.,120 the Second Circuit
affirmed a criminal conviction of a ship operating company based on
corporate vicarious liability under the Act to Prevent Pollution from
Ships (APPS).121 A number of crew members discharged oily waste
through a “magic hose” that bypassed “the vessel’s Oily Water

114. E.g., United States v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1986).
115. See COLIN DE LA RUE & CHARLES B. ANDERSON, SHIPPING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 909
(1998).
116. E.g., United States v. Ionia Mgmt. S.A., 555 F.3d 303, 309 (2d. Cir. 2009). The defendant in
Ionia did not challenge the vicarious liability jury instruction at the district court level. Id. However,
in United States v. Hanousek, the Ninth Circuit rejected Hanousek’s appeal for a vicarious liability
jury instruction after a jury convicted him of negligent discharge of oil. 176 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th
Cir. 1999). Hanousek argued he was not directly liable because a backhoe operator actually struck
the heating oil pipeline that caused the spill. Id. at 1119, 1122. The court of appeals held the failure
of the district court to offer a vicarious liability jury instruction did not constitute reversible error
because the instruction sufficiently required the jury to find direct negligence. Id. at 1123.
Hanousek’s employer, Pacific & Arctic Railway and Navigation Company, did not face charges. Id.
at 1119.
117. 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
118. Id. at 1500–01.
119. Id. at 1501, 1506–07. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or Solid Waste
Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992 (2006), includes corporations and partnerships under its
definition of a “person” and imposes criminal sanctions on persons for knowingly transporting
hazardous waste. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(15), 6928(d).
120. 555 F.3d 303 (2d Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 309, 311. The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) is structured similarly to the
CWA. The APPS includes corporations and partnerships under its definition of “person” and
imposes criminal penalties on “[a] person who knowingly violates the MARPOL Protocol,, [sic]
Annex IV to the Antarctic Protocol, this chapter, or the regulations issued thereunder.” 33 U.S.C. §§
1901(a)(8), 1908(a) (footnote omitted). Although the court did not specify that the APPS constituted
public welfare legislation, it did note that Congress adopted the APPS in order to effectuate
international treaties aimed at eliminating oil pollution. Ionia, 555 F.3d at 306.
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Separator” and made false entries in the oil record book.122 In addition to
conspiracy, falsifying records in a federal investigation, and obstructing
justice, the jury also found Ionia guilty of violating APPS provisions,
including failure to maintain oil record books.123
On appeal, Ionia did not challenge the imposition of vicarious liability
based on the statutory meaning of the APPS, but instead argued that the
prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove respondeat
superior criminal liability.124 Ionia also argued that the district court
provided an erroneous vicarious liability jury instruction because it did
not require the jury to find that managerial employees committed the
culpable acts.125 The Second Circuit found the record included sufficient
evidence to prove that the employees were authorized to act, acted
within the scope of employment, and did so to benefit Ionia.126 In
addition, the court noted that its precedent did not require managerial
actions to impute liability to the corporation, and regardless, the
managers approved the crew’s use of the “magic hose.”127
The Second Circuit also rejected a novel argument presented by a
group of business organizations, bar associations, and a conservative
public interest group in an amicus brief.128 The amici urged the court to
adopt an additional element to corporate vicarious criminal liability: a
finding that the corporation lacked “effective policies and procedures to
deter and detect criminal actions by its employees.”129 The amici
asserted that courts continually misinterpret New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States130 to impose a lower

122. Ionia, 555 F.3d at 305.
123. Id. at 305–06.
124. Id. at 309–10 (noting that the corporate criminal liability claim did “not require the [c]ourt to
interpret new areas of law and, hence, [could] be addressed summarily”).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 309.
127. Id. at 309–10.
128. See id. at 310; Brief for the Ass’n of Corp. Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellant Urging Reversal at 23, Ionia, 555 F.3d 303 (No. 07–5801) [hereinafter Brief for the Ass’n
of Corp. Counsel].
129. Brief for the Ass’n of Corp. Counsel, supra note 128, at 23 (quoting Andrew Weissmann
with David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 411 (2007)); id. at
9–15 (urging the court to look to respondeat superior principles in civil cases, such as in Title VII
sexual harassment cases, where employers can use an affirmative defense of an existing corporate
policy).
130. 212 U.S. 481 (1909); see supra notes 87, 109, and accompanying text.
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standard of corporate vicarious criminal liability.131 Although the court
noted that a compliance program may indicate whether an employee
acted within the scope of employment, it refused to adopt the amici’s
proposed additional element “regardless of asserted new Supreme Court
cases in other areas of the law.”132 The court upheld the $4.9 million
fine.133
In United States v. Little Rock Sewer Committee,134 the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas directly addressed the
permissibility of criminal vicarious liability under the CWA prior to the
passage of OPA 90.135 The court held a city sewer committee vicariously
criminally liable under the CWA for knowingly making false reports,
based on the actions of a sewer plant employee.136 The sewer committee
argued that vicarious liability should not apply because the individual
committee members lacked knowledge of the employee’s activities, but
the court found individual knowledge irrelevant because the entity itself
was the defendant.137 To reach its decision the court engaged in statutory
interpretation of the CWA. Finding the statute’s text unclear, the court
looked to legislative history, but found it provided little insight.138 As a
result, the court looked to the public welfare nature of the statute and
analogous precedent.139
Ultimately, the district court incorporated agency principles and held
the sewer committee vicariously criminally liable for negligent
discharge.140 It concluded that “the public interest protected by [the
CWA] is like, and is as important in its area of concern as, the public
interest protected under the Sherman Act.”141 Furthermore, the

131. Brief for the Ass’n of Corp. Counsel, supra note 128, at 15–17.
132. Ionia, 555 F.3d at 310 (referencing amici’s reliance on Title VII sexual harassment cases).
133. Id. at 311.
134. 460 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
135. Id. at 8–10.
136. Id. at 9–10.
137. Id. at 8.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 8–9 (relying on United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir.
1973) (holding a business vicariously liable for the crimes committed by an employee under the
Sherman Act because of “[t]he breadth and critical character of the public interests protected” and
because Congress intended for employers to regulate the conduct of employees under the Act)).
140. Id. at 10.
141. Id. at 8.
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enforcement provisions of the CWA “should be construed and applied
with a view toward achieving the same kind of ‘maximum
adherence.’”142 Thus, imputing the employee’s culpability to the sewer
committee proved “consistent with normal agency rules.”143
In the statutes at issue in International Hayes, Ionia, and Little Rock
Sewer Committee, Congress failed to state explicitly whether courts
could impose corporate vicarious criminal liability. The courts each
addressed different types of criminal convictions, but all upheld the
imposition of corporate criminal vicarious liability as long as the
employee was an agent of the corporation and acting within the scope of
employment.
IV.

COURTS SHOULD CONSTRUE THE CWA’S NEGLIGENT
DISCHARGE PROVISION TO PERMIT CORPORATE
VICARIOUS CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Typically, United States Attorneys do not prosecute corporations
vicariously for violations of the CWA negligent discharge of oil
provision. However, in cases where direct liability is difficult to prove
due to the nature of the corporate form, such as an inability to gather
certain types of evidence, prosecutors may wish to pursue vicarious
liability.144 Although the negligent discharge provision does not
expressly direct courts to apply vicarious liability, such an interpretation
is warranted in light of Congress’s intent and the public welfare nature
of the CWA and OPA 90. Construing the CWA to allow vicarious
criminal liability does not violate due process rights of corporations
because they are on notice of the stringent regulations surrounding oil
pollution. In addition, corporations are in the best position to prevent
spills and aggressive prosecution will encourage responsible corporate
conduct and deter future negligent acts that lead to oil spills. Although
142. Id.
143. Id. at 9.
144. See BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS MANUAL, supra note 96, § 9-28.700(B). The government is
unlikely to prosecute corporations that are completely faultless because the prosecutorial guidelines
advise United States Attorneys to weigh the same factors that they would for individual criminal
prosecutions. Attorneys are advised to consider the likelihood of success at trial as well as the
general purposes behind criminal law—deterrence, rehabilitation, restitution for victims, and
protection of the public. Id. § 9-28.300. Among other factors, United States Attorneys should look
to the sufficiency of evidence, consequences of conviction, “adequacy of noncriminal approaches,”
a corporation’s disclosure of the wrongdoing, and previous misconduct. Id.
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the Government proceeded against Fleet under a direct liability theory in
the Cusco Busan case,145 the case helps illustrate why courts can and
should construe the negligent discharge provision to allow for vicarious
liability.
A.

The Legislative Intent Behind OPA 90 and the CWA Directs
Courts to Allow Charges of Corporate Vicarious Criminal
Liability

The CWA negligent discharge provision does not explicitly provide
for vicarious liability. However, a plain language argument that the
statute is unambiguous and only attaches liability to the specific “person
who negligently” discharged oil146 does not apply to corporations
because, although they are persons under the CWA, they can only act
through their agents. Thus, such a reading would provide no opportunity
to charge a corporation with negligent discharge when Congress clearly
intended otherwise. Courts must look to the legislative history and intent
of the discharge provision as well as the public welfare status of the
statute to resolve this ambiguity.147
In adopting OPA 90, Congress responded to the failure of
corporations to prevent and clean up oil spills.148 Congress also found
that corporations viewed oil spills as just another cost of doing
business.149 Consequently, Congress added oil to the negligent discharge
provision and increased criminal penalties under the CWA to deter, as
well as punish, such corporate misbehavior.150
Congress also expressed concern over the danger oil spills posed to
“the public health and welfare and the environment.”151 The public
welfare nature of the CWA, as amended by OPA 90, permits a broad
reading of the statute. In other words, just as public welfare statutes
145. Third Superseding Indictment, supra note 4, at 2 (citing Fleet’s responsibility to select, train
and supervise the vessel’s crew).
146. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 76, at *44.
147. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252
(1922).
148. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2–3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24.
149. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724.
150. Oil Pollution Control Act 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 4301(c), 104 Stat. 484 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1321(b)(3) (2006)); H.R. REP. NO. 101-653, at 154 (1990) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 833.
151. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723.
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lower the mens rea for a particular crime, so too should they allow for
vicarious liability.152 Moreover, the rule of lenity is not applicable
because Congress’s intent is clear and no grievous ambiguity exists.153
Thus, courts should give full effect to Congress’s intent by allowing the
government to impute liability to a corporation for negligent discharge
by an employee under the CWA.
Furthermore, holding corporations vicariously criminally liable under
the negligent discharge provision does not violate due process. First,
shipowners, ship operators, and land-based corporations handling oil
have fair warning that oil discharges are heavily regulated and may
result in criminal prosecutions. Thus, corporations and their employees,
unlike the ordinary individuals Justice Thomas discussed in his dissent
to the denial of certiorari in Hanousek, are using specialized devices for
specialized purposes and are not ignorant that such activities are
regulated.154 Second, because corporations only face probation and fines
for punishment of criminal conduct, the severe penalties that concerned
Justice Thomas are similarly not applicable to corporations.155 Although
fines can prove substantial under the Alternative Fines Act, by their
nature they are less severe and pose a less substantial threat to due
process.156

152. See, e.g., United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ark. 1978)
(citing United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1973)); see LAFAVE,
supra note 96, § 13.5(c), at 705 (“[I]t is fair to say that generally the imposition of criminal liability
on corporations for any and all employees which constitute violations of strict-liability regulatory
offenses are sound . . . [and such liability] impose[s] a duty upon the corporation not to act in such a
way as to endanger the health, safety or welfare of the general public, and thus the corporation is
quite properly held for such acts by any employee.”).
153. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
154. See Hanousek v. United States, 528 U.S. 1102, 1103 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[W]e
should be hesitant to expose . . . construction workers and contractors to heightened criminal
liability for using ordinary devices to engage in normal industrial operations.”); see also LAFAVE,
supra note 96, § 13.4(c), at 699 (asserting that corporate vicarious criminal liability is typically only
found unconstitutional when the employer did not have any control over the employee or the
corporation tried to stop the tortious conduct).
155. See Hanousek, 528 U.S. at 1103–04 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. See LAFAVE, supra note 96, § 13.4(b), at 697.
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B.

Based on the Cosco Busan Facts, a Court Could Find Fleet
Vicariously Criminally Liable

In the case of the Cosco Busan, the government alleges Fleet is
directly liable for negligently training and supervising its agents, the
crew;157 however, the case illustrates why courts should permit United
States Attorneys to pursue vicarious liability. Fleet’s crew traveled, with
little sleep, from Beijing, China to Pusan, Korea, boarded the Cosco
Busan, and then stayed up through the night to run safety drills.158 “With
minimal training and preparation,” the crew set sail to the United
States.159 Later, when the vessel left the San Francisco Bay, Fleet failed
to develop a passage plan,160 failed to ensure the vessel’s safety by
allowing it to depart in heavy fog,161 and failed to properly instruct crewmembers of their responsibilities aboard the ship, among other
allegations.162 After the allision and resulting oil spill, Fleet also
allegedly tried to cover up its negligence by concealing ship records and
creating false and forged documents, including passage plans.163
In a motion to plead nolo contendere, Fleet asserted that the charges
were “purely vicarious,” the crew consisted of only “temporary agents,”
and the corporation’s officers “had no direct participation in the
circumstances leading to the allision.”164
Although the federal district court agreed with the government that
this is a case of direct liability,165 the CWA, as amended by OPA, would
allow the government to proceed against Fleet under a theory of
corporate vicarious criminal liability. Regardless of the pilot’s
negligence, the justifications for vicarious liability apply.166 Not only did
157. Government’s Opposition Brief, supra note 14, at 2–3.
158. Id. at 8.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 9–11.
161. Id. at 11–12.
162. Id. at 12–14.
163. Id. at 16.
164. Defendant Fleet Mgmt. Ltd.’s Notice of Motion and Motion for Consent to Enter Plea of
Nolo Contendere at 20, United States v. Cota, No. 08-00160 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter Fleet Brief].
165. See Cota, No. 08-00160, slip op. at 2–3, 2008 WL 4531804, at *1–2 (Oct. 7, 2008).
166. Fleet asserts in its briefing that the government is pursuing vicarious liability and that it
should escape liability because its crew consisted of “temporary agents.” Fleet Brief, supra note
164, at 20. This is similar to Hanousek’s argument that the backhoe driver was an independent
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Fleet choose to “delegate the conduct of [its] affairs,”167 but it was also
in the best position to protect third parties from the negligent conduct of
its employees. Fleet failed to structure the work of its employees
properly to ensure that tortious conduct would not likely occur.
Moreover, because Fleet stands to make substantial profits due to the
work of its employees, Fleet should bear the risk of its employees’
tortious conduct.
Holding Fleet vicariously liable would also serve the deterrent
function underlying the principle of respondeat superior and criminal
law. The threat of liability would deter Fleet from repeating mistakes
that led to the oil spill and encourage Fleet to change employee behavior
and corporate culture.168 It would also provide general deterrence “on a
broad scale” by putting other corporations in the shipping industry on
notice and incentivizing them to take actions to reduce tortious
conduct.169 In the shipping industry, criminal penalties are often central
to deterring tortious conduct because corporations, such as Fleet, hold
protection and indemnity insurance which covers legal expenses, civil
claims, and sometimes even portions of criminal fines.170 Thus, allowing
corporations to escape liability essentially allows corporations to
continue calculating oil spills as a cost of doing business, which
Congress explicitly legislated against.171
contractor, and thus, not his agent. Brief of Appellant, supra note 76 at *44. However, the
legislative intent behind OPA 90 coupled with the public welfare nature of the CWA may justify, as
a matter of public policy, finding a non-delegable duty of due care in matters involving oil spills.
Congress wanted to punish and deter corporations for negligent discharge. Allowing corporations to
escape liability, even if it is criminal, by claiming their workers are independent contractors and not
agents would only incentivize corporations to use contractors. In Fleet’s case, it would prove
difficult to argue that the crew was not carrying out the work of the corporation. Moreover, a nondelegable duty theory may allow the imputation of liability from a compulsory pilot, who is
traditionally not an agent, to a shipowner or ship management company. See, e.g., United States v.
S.S. President Van Buren, 490 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding shipowners are liable under
theory of respondeat superior for negligence of voluntary pilot but compulsory pilots are not
agents).
167. United States v. Little Rock Sewer Comm., 460 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (quoting
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1973)).
168. See BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS MANUAL, supra note 96, § 9-28.200 (citing factors for
United States Attorneys to consider when deciding whether to prosecute corporations including: the
response to the incident, effectiveness of programs in place, and history of wrongdoing, among
others).
169. Id. § 9-28.200(B).
170. See Cota, No. 08-00160, slip op. at 4, 2008 WL 4531804, at *2.
171. S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 2–3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723–24.
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CONCLUSION
Although the plain language of the CWA, as amended by OPA 90,
does not expressly call for holding corporations vicariously criminally
liable for the negligent discharge violations of employees, the legislative
intent and public welfare nature of the CWA support construing the
statute to allow for such liability. Doing so will not violate the due
process rights of corporations, and holding corporations liable is
important because it will deter future negligent conduct that may result
in oil spills, which damage not only America’s waters but also harm
America’s environment, economy, and general welfare.
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